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Is childhood a ‘disability’? Exploring the exclusion 
of children from age discrimination provisions in the 
Equality Act 2010 
 
The Equality Act 2010 was enacted with the aim of simplifying existing equality 
legislation and included extending age discrimination protection beyond the workplace to 
cover the provision of goods, facilities and services. Under-18s, however, were omitted 
from such provisions, despite lobbying from a number of different organisations and 
parliamentarians. This article considers the significance of this exclusion. It both 
challenges the legitimacy of the decision to exclude children, and considers the 
difficulties that arise from including under-18s within age discrimination provisions, 
namely those relating to children’s autonomy, capacity and right to equal treatment. In 
particular, it asks whether the question of children’s capacity to make decisions, the main 
ground on which children are denied all the human rights enjoyed by adults, should be 
revisited in light of the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,1 under which a finding of incapacity on the basis of disability constitutes 
discrimination. It goes on to explore other areas of convergence between childhood and 
disability studies, and particularly the benefits, and shortcomings, of a ‘social model’ 
approach to childhood. 
Introduction 
The omission of children2 from age discrimination protection relating to the provision of 
goods, facilities and services in the Equality Act 2010 (EA),3 which came into force on 1 
October 2012, attracted relatively little public or political controversy.4 At the time of the 
passage of the Bill, Harriet Harman, then Leader of the House of Commons, told MPs: 
‘The provisions will not cover people under 18. It is right to treat children and young 
people differently … and there is little evidence of harmful age discrimination against 
young people’.5 A statement from the Equality Office went on to say that: 
‘The vast majority of examples submitted as evidence [of discrimination in 
the consultation] would already be covered by existing human rights 
legislation, existing domestic discrimination legislation or more thoroughly 
dealt with through public sector duties. It was decided that age discrimination 
legislation is not an appropriate way to ensure that children’s needs are met. It 
                                                 
1 Adopted on 13 December 2006. 
2 Children are defined for the purposes of the Act as people under the age of 18. 
3 Section 28(1)(a). 
4 In addition, children’s homes and schools were also excluded from the public sector equality duty, which requires 
public bodies to have due regard to equality and non-discrimination (s 149).  
5 C Davies, ‘Discrimination “a fact of life for British children”’ (2009) The Guardian, 29 March. 
is almost always right to treat children of different ages in a way which is 
appropriate to their particular stage of development. Any such legislation 
would require a large number of exceptions.’6 
The ban on age discrimination in clubs and associations, on the other hand, applies to all 
ages,7 and neither is protection from discrimination in employment restricted to the over-
18s.8 Service providers include all those involved in the provision of services, goods or 
facilities to the public, regardless of whether or not a payment is provided. A wide range 
of activities fall within the scope of section 29, including the provision of medical 
treatment by the NHS and the sale of finance products by private banks.9  
In contrast, people with disabilities (among others) are protected from discrimination in 
all social spheres covered by the EA, including in the provision of goods, services and 
facilities.10 As well as considering the justification for excluding children, the purpose of 
this article is to explore whether any helpful analogies can be drawn between discourse 
on the rights of children and people with disabilities. The reason for this approach is that 
the question of age discrimination gives rise to legal and theoretical questions, 
particularly relating to the conceptual puzzles of equality, capacity and autonomy, which 
pervade discourse on both children’s rights and disability. This question is particularly 
pertinent since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, under which a finding of incapacity on the basis of intellectual impairment 
constitutes discrimination.  
Justifying the exclusion 
There was some opposition to the exclusion of children during the Equality Bill 
consultation exercise. Despite Harriet Harman’s claim to the contrary, Young Equals, an 
organisation set up to campaign for protection from age discrimination for children and 
young people, and composed of organisations including Liberty and Save the Children,11 
submitted a dossier of evidence of age discrimination against children and young people. 
The report concluded, among other findings, that older children aged 16 and 17 received 
less favourable treatment from health services than young children or adults, and that age 
boundaries between services had a particularly negative impact on the most 
disadvantaged children.12 There was also criticism about the lack of planned provision 
for homeless youths (43% of 30 key local authorities did not have a specific strategy for 
dealing with youth homelessness), and about children being unfairly refused entry to 
                                                 
6 UK Government Equalities Office (EO), Equality Act 2010: banning age discrimination in services, public functions 
and associations, equality impact assessment (TSO, 2010), at p 25. 
7 Equality Act, s 28(1)(a).  
8 Ibid, s 100. 
9 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Services, Public Functions and Associations: Statutory Code of Practice 
(TSO, 2011). 
10 Equality Act 2010, s 6 and Part 3. 
11 Young Equals, Making the Case: why children should be protected from age discrimination and how it can be done, 
proposals for the Equality Bill (Young Equals, 2009). 
12 Ibid, at p 8. 
public services such as libraries, leisure centres, museums and art galleries.13 Children 
were also routinely found to be refused access to shops.14 The organisation argued that 
specific non-discrimination measures might give 16 and 17 year olds equal access to 
social services and mental health services, prevent shop keepers from installing 
‘mosquito’ devices15 that deter children of all ages from accessing their services, and 
ensure that children making calls to ambulance services are taken seriously. 
The exclusion of children ran contrary to the submissions of a number of other bodies 
too, including the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), composed of 
representatives from both the House of Commons and House of Lords, which argued that 
‘the total absence of protection against age discrimination for those under 18 in service 
provision … means that children who are subject to unjustified discrimination are left 
with little or no legal protection’.16 In 2008, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child specifically identified the Equality Bill that was under consultation at the time, 
welcoming ‘plans to consolidate and strengthen equality legislation, with clear 
opportunities to mainstream children’s right to non-discrimination into the UK anti-
discrimination law (forthcoming Equality Bill)’.17 
Although, as discussed further below, age discrimination is arguably distinguishable from 
other forms of discrimination, it can have profound, perhaps long-lasting effects. 
Perceptions of stigma, and feelings of shame, may result in diminished self‐esteem and 
other negative mental health outcomes, as well as, for example, delays in seeking 
treatment for medical problems.18 From a more positive perspective, it has been argued 
that encouraging young children to participate actively in decision-making can help to 
foster autonomy and responsibility in later life.19 There is, moreover, a good argument 
favouring children’s inclusion in provisions relating to goods, services and facilities 
based on their, often underestimated, economic contribution. As Helen Stalford observes, 
in the context of EU law: 
‘there is now a substantial body of research revealing the extent of children’s 
direct contribution … both through their engagement in formal, paid 
employment, as consumers and clients of a vast range of services, notably 
education, leisure and sport, and in less quantifiable yet equally valid 
domestic caring and house-working arrangements and community-based 
                                                 
13 Ibid, at pp 10 and 14. 
14 Ibid, at p 16. 
15 These devices emit a high-pitched noise which causes discomfort to anyone under 25, and are used in public to 
disperse groups of teenagers. See Liberty, Press FAQs Mosquito device (Liberty, 2010), accessible at: 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/factsheets/top-facts-on-the-mosquito-device.pdf. 
16 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill, twenty-sixth report of session 2009, House of Lords and the House of 
Commons (TSO, 2009), at p 23. 
17 UNCRC, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/4 
(United Nations, 2008), at p 6. 
18 P Corrigan and A Watson, ‘The paradox of self‐stigma and mental illness’ (2002) 9 Clinical Psychology: Science 
and Practice 35; B Link and J Phelan, ‘On stigma and its public health implications’ (2006) 367(9509) Lancet 528. 
19 S Dodds, ‘Choice and Control in Feminist Bioethics’, in C Mackenzie and N Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (Oxford University Press, 2000), at pp 213–235. 
voluntary activities.’20 
It seems difficult to marry, therefore, the recognition of children as consumers21 with the 
refusal to afford them the opportunity to challenge instances of unfair treatment. It is 
notable that children are presumed to be incapable of entering into contracts, and will not 
be bound even if this is to the detriment of the other contracting party. A minor is thus 
able to cancel any contract made before they reach the age of majority, and for a 
reasonable time thereafter.22 Minors are, however, legally bound when acquiring goods 
and services considered essential for living, or beneficial to them, including contracts for 
services.23 So although minors may enter into binding agreements with providers of 
goods and services, they have no express protection if these providers treat them unfairly 
because of their age. The practical reasons for excluding children, provided by the 
Equality Office, above, are also unconvincing. The government said it was concerned 
that: 
‘certain age-based services for children could be withdrawn by service 
providers in the mistaken belief that they were no longer lawful; or the law 
might be used as a convenient excuse to withdraw services that would have 
been withdrawn anyway.’24  
Yet it would be strange, as noted elsewhere25 for service providers working in the interest 
of their clients to withdraw services without properly considering the EA’s provisions. A 
given provider can defend its decision if it can show that its conduct is a ‘proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’,26 a test which would be satisfied were the provider 
able to prove that the services were being supplied to specific age groups because of 
particular, identified needs, and that the means used were fair.27 The guidance suggests 
that possible legitimate aims could include enabling particular social groups to socialise 
together, to enjoy activities together or to enjoy peace and quiet.28 In Australia, the Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 applies to children under 18, including in the provision of goods 
and services albeit subject to certain exemptions, but has seemingly not given rise to any 
systematic difficulties for service providers.29 
                                                 
20 H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Hart, 2012), at pp 9–10. 
21 For a discussion of children as consumers, see R Brusdal and I Frønes ,‘Children as Consumers’, in G Melton et al 
(eds), The Sage Handbook of Child Research (Sage, 2013). 
22 J O’Sullivan and J Hilliard, The Law of Contract (OUP, 5th edn, 2012). See also the Minors’ Contracts Act 1987. 
23 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 3. T Cockburn, ‘Authors of their own lives? Children, contracts, their responsibilities, 
rights and citizenship’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Children’s Rights 377. 
24 Ibid. 
25 S Flacks, ‘Deviant disabilities: the exclusion of drug and alcohol addiction from the Equality Act 2010’ (2012) 21(3) 
Social & Legal Studies 395. 
26 Equality Act 2010, s 13(2). 
27 However, harassment or victimisation because of a person’s age is not capable of justification. 
28 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Services, Public Functions and Associations: Statutory Code of Practice 
(TSO, 2011). 
29 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill, twenty-sixth report of session 2009, House of Lords and the House of 
Commons (TSO, 2009). See also J Hemingway, Roadmap to ADA: The Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, 2007). 
Moreover, there is already a long list of exceptions to section 29 of the EA, both in the 
act itself and the Age Exceptions Order which accompanies the Act.30 There are general 
exceptions applying to age-based (and other forms of) discrimination including where 
another piece of legislation allows or requires people to be treated differently because of 
their age, for example, regarding state benefits, adopting and fostering, winter fuel 
allowances and so on. Exceptions also apply where a charity provides benefits only to 
people of a particular age or age group. Were under-18s to be included in the provisions, 
it would thus remain lawful to refuse to sell alcohol to children or for a charity to provide 
services aimed only at under-16s, for example. In addition, there are some lawful 
exceptions which relate specifically to age, including the provision of financial services 
such as insurance, and ‘beneficial concessions’ in services such as free travel. ‘Positive 
action’31 which treats people differently according to their age is also allowed. This is 
action in which certain disadvantages experienced by a particular group are prevented or 
compensated for. This might include, for example, specialist young people’s services 
which have been set up to improve literacy and employability.  
The argument about the adequacy of existing legislation to cope with such claims is also 
weak, since the same claim could be made in respect of older people. It is true that under 
the Children Acts 1989 and 2004, it is already the case that provision must be based on 
need rather than age, but these existing provisions do not specifically preclude age 
discrimination for under-18s. Clear legislative provisions would be more likely to effect 
change and redress unfair instances of different treatment, according to Young Equals.32 
A public sector equality duty33 requires that public authorities have ‘due regard’ to the 
need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation, to advance 
equality, and to foster good relations. Yet schools and children’s homes were omitted 
from this duty, again contrary to the submissions of Young Equals34 and the JCHR,35 
with the former arguing that ‘children’s services and schools have an established role in 
challenging inequalities’.36 It is notable that no such exclusions were enacted for homes 
or institutions for people with disabilities. Finally, some of the arguments from the 
Equality Office would seem to justify the exclusion of children from all age 
discrimination provisions. Why, then, are they excluded from some and not others? A 
likely explanation is that, since under-18s were already included within the purview of 
the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, for example, and that the ban on age 
discrimination in clubs and associations is confined to fairly limited social circumstances, 
                                                 
30 Equality Act 2010 (Age Exceptions) Order 2012 (SI 2012/2466). 
31 Equality Act 2010, s 158. 
32 Young Equals, Making the Case: why children should be protected from age discrimination and how it can be done, 
proposals for the Equality Bill (Young Equals, 2009), at p 5. 
33 Equality Act 2010, s 149. 
34 Young Equals, Making the Case: why children should be protected from age discrimination and how it can be done, 
proposals for the Equality Bill (Young Equals, 2009). 
35 JCHR, Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill, twenty-sixth report of session 2009, House of Lords and the House of 
Commons (TSO, 2009), at p 3. 
36 Young Equals, Making the Case: why children should be protected from age discrimination and how it can be done, 
proposals for the Equality Bill (Young Equals, 2009), at p 6. There is scope for exploring this exclusion in more detail, 
but more space would be needed to do it justice. 
extending equal rights to children in the large and complex sphere of goods, facilities and 
services required a greater commitment to children’s equality. 
In addition to the practical utility of the legislation, the ‘expressive value’ of rights 
recognition, notes Lucinda Ferguson, should not be discounted as mere semantics.37 She 
writes:  
‘The statement that a child has a particular right is both an expression of an 
existing social norm that recognises the importance of the content of that 
legal right to the child, as well as a means of changing social norms to be 
more reflective of that importance.’38  
Moreover, an integral quality of children’s rights, and human rights in general, is their 
proposed value in redressing power imbalances.39 For a country in which studies and 
reports repeatedly reveal the extent of the stigmatisation of children, particularly 
teenagers,40 the right to non-discrimination on the basis of an age-based status might 
constitute both an avenue of redress and an expressive means with which to challenge the 
attitudes of the powerful adult majority. 
It is arguable, then, that although the government’s decision to exclude children was 
stated to be partly based on practical justifications, the long list of exceptions and, 
perhaps most importantly, a justification defence, would seem to satisfy such 
reservations. The reference to children’s ‘needs’ rather than rights, and the professed 
necessity for treating children differently, display a reluctance for enshrining the parity of 
individuals aged under 18 with those who are older. Although it is possible that the 
government simply overestimated the practical difficulties involved in including children, 
Harriet Harman emphasised that children are different from adults, and so must be 
treated appropriately. 
The next section explores the notion of equal treatment further. Although obviously 
relevant, I do not intend to duplicate well-established arguments about, or reasons for, 
adult resistance to children as rights-holders, nor do I have anything further to add to the 
corpus of literature on the nuances between, and importance of, different theories of 
children’s rights.41 However, since the attribution of equal rights for both children and 
people with disabilities have historically been contingent on (contested) notions of 
capacity, vulnerability and, relatedly, autonomy,42 I want to use the question of age 
                                                 
37 L Ferguson, ‘Not merely rights for children but children’s rights: the theory gap and the assumption of the 
importance of children’s rights’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Children’s Rights 177. 
38 Ibid, at p 183. 
39 J Tobin, ‘Justifying children’s rights’ (2013) 21(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 410. 
40 See P Kelly, ‘Growing up as risky business? Risks, surveillance and the institutionalized mistrust of youth’ (2003) 
6(2) Journal of Youth Studies 165; Echo, Women in Journalism: Teenage Boys and the Media (2009) available at: 
http://66.151.177.92/data/File/pdf/WiJ%20%20charts%20Echo%20Version.pdf. 
41 See, for example, D Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Routledge, 2nd edn, 2004); J Eekelaar, ‘The 
emergence of children’s rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161; J Tobin, ‘Justifying children’s rights’ 
(2013) 21(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 410. M Freeman, ‘The human rights of children’ (2010) 63(1) 
Current Legal Problems 1. 
42 See S Gilmore and J Herring, ‘“No” is the hardest word: consent and children’s autonomy’ [2011] CFLQ 3; 
J Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility: Young Children and Healthcare Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007); V 
discrimination to furrow the shared ground between disability and childhood studies, with 
the subject of non-discrimination remaining central to the discussion.  
Discrimination, rights and capacity 
Although there is little doubt that discrimination in respect of both children and older 
people, the latter having formed the basis of almost all discussion on the subject, is 
harmful,43 age discrimination is in general understood to be different from other forms of 
unfair treatment. In particular, Sandra Fredman adds that, unlike race or gender (and 
presumably disability), age ‘does not define a discreet group’. She writes: 
‘We have all been young, and we will all, if we are fortunate, become old. 
Thus, the basic opposition between “self” and “other” which marks much of 
racism and sexism is not present in the same way.’44 
Although this highlights an important conceptual distinction between disability and 
childhood which will be discussed in due course, there are also analogies to be made. 
Jonathan Herring notes that the question of autonomy, which is afforded on the basis of 
capacity, ‘distinguishes the variety of theoretical approaches towards children’,45 and that 
discourse has evolved from the notion of whether children should have any rights at all, 
to whether children have the right to make mistakes. Autonomy is understood to refer to 
the capacity to be ‘one’s own person’, free from distorting influences,46 although the 
(idealistic) idea of the autonomous subject has also been subject to extensive critique, 
including philosophical, feminist and sociological interrogation from Michel Foucault,47 
Robert Young48 and Jennifer Nedelsky,49 among others. 
Liberal moral philosophy has historically framed personhood and identity according to 
(adult) measures of capacity and rationality, thereby excluding children from the status of 
rights holder,50 as well as women, non-whites and people with disabilities.51 52 According 
to Archard, ‘childhood is defined as that which lacks the capacities, skills and powers of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chico and L Hagger, ‘The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and mature minors: wise legislation or a missed opportunity?’ 
(2011) 33(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 157. 
43 D Price, ‘The poverty of older people in the UK’ (2006) 20(3) Journal of Social Work Practice 251; S Fredman and 
S Spencer, Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives (Hart, 2003). 
44 S Fredman, ‘The Age of Equality’ in Fredman and Spencer ibid. 
45 J Herring, ‘Children’s Rights for Grown Ups’, in Fredman and Spencer ibid, at p 146. 
46 J Christman, ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009), accessible 
at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
47 M Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in C Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972–
1977 (Pantheon Books, 1977). 
48 R Young, Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (St Martin’s Press, 1986). 
49 J Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving autonomy: sources, thoughts, and possibilities’ (1989) 1(1) Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 7. 
50 J Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P H Nidditch (ed) (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
51 P Alderson, ‘Researching Children’s Rights to Integrity’, in B Mayall (ed), Children’s Childhoods: Observed and 
Experienced (Falmer Press, 1994). 
52 N Naffine, ‘Sexing the Subject (of Law)’, in M Thornton (ed), Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
adulthood. To be a child is to be not yet an adult’.53 Katherine Federle notes that the 
reversion to capacity sustains children’s powerlessness, and the perception that the child 
lacks the capacities of a legal subject has allowed him or her to be constructed as 
problems or objects of intervention, rather than as legal subjects.54 Yet according to 
Donnelly, the requirement of legal capacity is treated as fact, in spite of its inherent 
normativity: 
‘Whether or not a person has capacity to make a particular decision depends 
on whether she reaches a designated standard in respect of specified abilities. 
What is required, both in respect of the standard to be reached and in respect 
of the necessary abilities, depends on the view of autonomy which we 
hold.’55 56 
There is therefore no objective, ‘scientific’ test for capacity. Rather, established 
assessments are calibrated according to the norm of the able-bodied (male) ‘adult’. As 
such, the approach to children’s capacity is rooted in an individualistic, bio-medical view 
of developing capacities which revolves around cognitive functioning. This social 
construction of capacity aligns with the social construction of childhood, an observation 
that will be discussed in due course. 
Of course, capacities do evolve with age, yet children may develop abilities at different 
ages depending on cultural, familial and social circumstances. It is now well established 
that ‘adults consistently underestimate children’s capacities’,57 while Weithorn and 
Campbell conclude that most 14 year olds have equivalent competence to adults.58 
Priscilla Alderson59 has also argued that treating children with respect can raise 
competence levels, drawing to mind Honoré’s suggestion that being responsible for the 
outcome of our conduct is essential for our identity formation, and ‘to deny people’s 
responsibility for their actions is to strike at their identity’.60 Article 5 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), as discussed further below, refers to the 
exercise of children’s rights according to the ‘evolving capacities of the child’. The UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has elaborated, to some extent, its view of the 
meaning of capacity in a General Comment on the right of the child to be heard.61 It 
emphasises that state parties ‘cannot begin with the presumption that a child is incapable 
                                                 
53 D Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Routledge, 2nd edn, 2004), at p 39. 
54 K Federle, ‘On the road to reconceiving rights for children: a post-feminist analysis of the capacity principle’ (1993) 
42 De Paul Law Review 983. 
55 M Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), at p 3. 
56 Ibid, at p 2. 
57 G Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (UNICEF/Innocenti Research Centre, 2005), at p 30. 
58 L Weithorn and S Campbell, ‘The competency of children and adolescents to make informed treatment decisions 
child development’ (1982) 53(6) Early Adolescence 1589.  
59 P Alderson, ‘Rights of Children and Young People’, in A Coote (ed), The Welfare of Citizens (IPPR/Rivers Oram 
Press, 1992), at pp 153–180. 
60 T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart, 1999), at p 10. 
61 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12: The right of the child to be heard 
(2009), CRC/C/GC/12. 
of expressing his or her own views. On the contrary, State parties should presume a child 
has the capacity to form her or his own views…’ (paragraph 20).  
Questions regarding children, capacity and autonomy tend to boomerang back to ‘Gillick’ 
competency, which originally referred to the circumstances under which children under 
16 can consent to medical treatment, particularly obtaining contraception, without 
parental knowledge.62 There is not space here to delve deeply into the case and 
subsequent decisions,63 but the law on competency to make healthcare decisions 
encapsulates the struggle between a liberal veneration of individual autonomy and the 
paternalistic exigency for child protection. It has been argued that a paternalistic desire to 
protect children, in particular, has ‘legitimised routine and endemic discrimination 
against children on grounds of age’.64 The autonomy/protection dichotomy, and the 
issues of capacity and discrimination, have also permeated discourse on the rights of 
persons with intellectual disabilities.  
Disability and childhood: a case for ‘equal rights’? 
Discrimination against people with intellectual disabilities has historically been 
widespread,65 with presumed incapacity informing routine human rights violations. Peter 
Bartlett notes that ‘People with mental health problems are often found to lack capacity 
on the flimsiest of evidence, sometimes without notice that [any] proceedings are 
occurring’.66 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted 
in 2006, was therefore an important landmark for addressing the ways in which people 
with disabilities are marginalised and excluded. Article 12(2) states that signatories must 
‘recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others 
in all aspects of life’. Moreover, Article 2(3) provides that: ‘States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they 
may require in exercising their legal capacity’. This provision also has relevance for the 
rights of children. 
The focus of Article 12 is thus on providing support in order for people with disabilities 
to be able to make their own decisions. In light of this article, a finding of legal 
incapacity on the basis of disability constitutes discrimination. Bach and Kerzner suggest 
that: ‘The language of Article 12 represents a shift from the traditional dualistic model of 
[mental] capacity versus [mental] incapacity and is viewed as an equality-based approach 
                                                 
62 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Department of Health and Social Security [1986] AC 
112. For a recent discussion, see E Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and resolving problems with the. concept of 
child competence’ (2013) 34(1) Legal Studies 103. It should be noted that capacity is distinct from legal competence. 
Although capacity might be required for competence, legal competence concerns the degree of mental capacity 
necessary to make decisions about a specific issue or to carry out a specific act. 
63 See also S Gilmore and J Herring, ‘“No” is the hardest word: consent and children's autonomy’ [2011] CFLQ 3, and 
E Cave and J Wallbank, ‘Minors’ capacity to refuse treatment: a reply to Gilmore and Herring’ (2012) 20(3) Medical 
Law Review 423; E Cave, ‘Maximisation of minor’s capacity’ [2011] CFLQ 431. 
64 H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Hart, 2012), at p 52.  
65 See, for example, A Cooper, C Melville and J Morrison, ‘People with intellectual disabilities. Their health needs 
differ and need to be recognised and met’ (2004) 329 BMJ 414. 
66 P Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and mental health law’ (2012) 
75(5) Modern Law Review 761. 
to legal capacity’.67 Bartlett cautions that capacity tests are not inherently problematic. 
He writes: ‘The fact that [the capacity test] is used inappropriately in large parts of the 
world – perhaps including England and Wales – does not necessarily mean all its uses are 
discriminatory’.68 The more important debate, contends Bartlett, concerns the nature of 
support offered to individuals in making decisions.69  
Bach and Kerzner70 invoke Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach71 to maintain that 
capacity tests should be replaced by measures of ‘decision-making capability’.72 Such 
measures cannot be based on disability status and include both assessment of individual 
decision-making and an understanding of the supports and accommodations needed to 
exercise legal capacity in relation to others including entering agreements and making 
contracts.73 The point is again that support and accommodation may be supplied so that 
different decision-making abilities can be turned into decision-making capabilities in 
order to exercise legal capacity. Back and Kerzner explain: 
‘The question can no longer be: Does a person have the mental capacity to 
exercise their legal capacity? In other words, mental capacity can no longer 
serve as a proxy for legal capacity. Rather, the question is: What types of 
supports are required for the person to exercise his or her legal capacity?’74 
Similarly, a shift from capacity to capability within children’s rights assessments would 
reflect a focus on their abilities rather than a ‘deficit approach’ to childhood. There is also 
potentially a negative, non-discrimination obligation on states to remove restrictions on 
children’s rights based on mental capacity assessments. This would reflect the growing 
jurisprudential respect for children’s autonomy within the law in general.75 Parents or 
guardians are usually entrusted as the individuals providing decision-making support, and 
Back and Kerzner contend that: ‘in a positive liberty view of autonomy we do not 
                                                 
67 M Bach and A Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity (Law 
Commission of Ontario, 2010), at p 30. 
68 P Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and mental health law’ (2012) 
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exercise our self-determination as isolated, individual selves, but rather “relationally,” 
interdependently and intersubjectively with others’.76 Tensions between different 
conceptions of autonomy revolve around the role of the person who is assisting with 
decision-making.77 
There are deeper challenges to pursuing a supported decision-making approach to 
children’s rights. Although there has been much concern about the guardianship of adults 
with disabilities, and the potential for violating autonomy rights, scholarship relating to 
the participation and independence of children has tended to be more equivocal in 
accepting the necessity for parental decision-making on behalf of children, rather than 
pressing for a supported decision-making role within parenthood.78 For example, some 
states and countries have begun to amend their guardianship laws in order to reflect the 
CRPD and a focus on supported decision-making, including British Columbia in 
Canada.79 The UNCRC, however, does not go so far as to suggest changing parenthood 
laws to reflect children’s capacity to make decisions,80 and the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has expressly recognised that ‘parents (and other caregivers) are 
normally the major conduit through which young children are able to realise their 
rights’.81 Although, in recent years, and since the enactment of the Children’s Acts in 
1989 and 200482 and ensuing case-law,83 the UK has seen a greater focus on the wishes 
and participation of children, there is nonetheless a reluctance to give children’s decision-
making too much weight in case this is deemed contrary to their best interests.84 There is 
certainly a branch of commentary in childhood studies that advocates for greater 
participatory rights for children, particularly from ‘child liberationists’85 and particularly 
in the health sphere,86 but it rarely goes so far as to demand changes to the law on 
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parenting in order to shift towards a more advocatory role for parents. Federle suggests 
that appointing parents to act as agents for children ‘overlooks the potential for conflict 
between a parent’s role as agent and as duty bearer’, and that parents might consequently 
wave their responsibilities to children.87 She suggests that a system of child agents would 
be also problematic in application since ‘it is unclear how every child could have access 
to such an agent each time the child’s rights are affected’.88 In contrast, there has been a 
groundswell of support for reforming guardianship laws in the context of disability, and 
an acceptance that people with disabilities may require independent advocates who are 
able to support decision-making and enable rights-claiming.89 
A ‘social model’ of childhood 
Having largely focused thus far on the question of capacity, the discussion will now turn 
to broader comparative issues relating to disability and childhood. An emphasis on 
normative arguments can cloud the often politicised nature of ‘rights talk’, and the 
recognition that both disability and childhood act as repositories for essentially contested 
principles and values relating to beliefs about care, needs, duties, responsibilities and 
citizenship, as well as rights. Sociological scholarship on both disability and childhood 
has proliferated in recent years, and has in particular included observations about 
ambivalent representation and constitution. Children are characterised as innocents and 
deviants, autonomous consumers and passive recipients and, although they also escape 
such dichotomous categorisation, they are often portrayed as objects of curiosity or (at 
least potential) abnormality.90 Images of people with disabilities can also be classified 
according to a limited number of designations, most notably ‘brave’ and ‘inspiring’ 
heroes or tragic victims, but invariably depicting ‘sufferers’, and rarely invoking images 
of ‘normality’.91 Both children and people with disabilities act as sites onto which 
‘capable’ adults’ anxieties and fantasies are projected, including fears about death, 
vulnerability and social disorder as well as retrospective desires for a romanticised 
childhood and prospective hopes for society.92  
The requirement, under Article 12 of the CRPD, that people with disabilities are provided 
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with support in order that they may exercise their legal capacity is one rooted in the 
‘social model’ of disability which incorporates efforts to reframe discourse on disability 
to one of enablement rather than abnormality. This model demands consideration of the 
barriers to the equitable participation of people who have physical or mental 
‘impairments’ in the social sphere, and suggests that the ‘disabling environment’ created 
by the division between disabled and ‘non-disabled’ is responsible for them, rather than 
any inherent affliction or condition.93 Disability itself, which defies a universal and 
accepted definition,94 is understood as a social construction rather than a ‘natural’ state. 
The model therefore rests on a fundamental difference between ‘impairment’, a neutral 
body/mind affliction, and ‘disability’, which results from subsequent interaction with 
society. 
The CRPD has adopted the social model approach, emphasising that persons with 
disabilities include those with impairments who may be prevented from full participation 
in society due to interactions with barriers.95 The drafters of the EA in fact fell back on 
the ‘medical model’ of disability, through which a person’s disability is defined by 
individual diagnosis or pathology, by including the meaning and definition of the mental 
or physical impairment as fundamental facets for any claim.96 In other countries 
favouring a social model, there is less emphasis on the person’s impairment with the 
focus shifting to determining whether a discriminatory act has actually occurred.97 That 
said, the EA amends provisions under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 by 
removing the list of ‘capacities’ that comprised the definition of disability.98 However, 
this was explained as being for practical reasons since the list had been identified as 
serving little purpose in helping to confirm that a person should have protection, and as 
complicating the definition of disability. It was also argued that people with mental health 
conditions ‘had found it hard to show how their impairment had affected one of the listed 
capacities’.99 This latter complaint reflects the priority accorded to physical disabilities 
rather than mental impairments.100  
More recently, activists and scholars in the field of disability studies have been enmeshed 
in an ongoing argument about how far this social constructionist revision of disability 
extends. Commentators have questioned whether disability can be ‘reduced’ to the social 
when there are quite clearly ‘biological facts’ relating to particular impairments borne by 
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a minority of people.101 The originators of the social model have tended to resist the 
suggestion that there is any biological or natural element of disability at all. However, 
Bickenbach et al, argue that: 
‘The nature of the link between impairment and disability is an important 
issue for any social theory of disablement, since without some researchable 
connection it would not be possible to distinguish the socially-created 
disadvantages of disablement from those of race, gender, class or economic 
status … Disablement is essentially, conceptually, linked to a health status (or 
the perception of a health status).’102 
Similarly, Vehmas and Makela write that: ‘there is nothing oppressive in admitting that 
impairment includes both physical and social dimensions’.103 
The field of childhood studies has been beset with comparable arguments, pivoting on the 
apparently binary nature of the biology/culture distinction.104 The suggestion that 
childhood is a socially constructed phenomenon rather than a ‘natural’ state has spawned 
a body of academic commentary.105 In this context, ‘age’ can be aligned with 
‘impairment’. The question is the same: how much are age or impairment ‘natural’ givens 
and biological realities, or alternatively social constructs? It has been argued that those 
who have affirmed childhood to be (only) a socially constructed phenomenon also 
neglect consideration of the physical and biological facts, or differences, that distinguish 
(particularly young) children from adults.106 Archard writes that: 
‘The child liberationists overstate their case when they represent all childhood 
incapacity as mere conventional, enforced dependency. Some of it is natural. 
Being very young does mean being small and weak, even if the contrast 
between dependent child and independent adult can be exaggerated.’107  
Archard goes on to argue that, just because conceptions of childhood differ between 
cultures, it does not mean that the concept of children is purely socially constructed. He 
notes that: ‘All societies – save the last – have children. Every society does not have to 
understand what it is to be a child in the same way as the others’.108 Child liberationists 
have long argued that according rights on the basis of age alone would be 
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discriminatory.109 However, as Archard notes, this is not to discount the fact that ‘age 
may supply some guide to one’s relative competence’ (author’s emphasis).110 In the same 
way that the precise boundaries of childhood may differ from culture to culture, the term 
‘disability’ is inherently ill-defined. Linton asserts that it is ‘a linchpin in a complex web 
of social ideals, institutional structures and government policies’.111  
A body of work in both disability and childhood studies has gone on to build on the 
simplistic dichotomy between social constructionism and biological ‘reality’ to produce a 
more nuanced conception of childhood and disability. Alan Prout argues that social 
studies of childhood have in general been beset with oppositional dichotomies including 
nature/culture, structure/agency, being/becoming and so on.112 In particular, he notes that 
‘children’s capacities are extended and supplemented by all kinds of material artefacts 
and technologies, which are also hybrids of nature and culture. This shapes the 
constitution of childhood and the experiences and actions of children’.113 Similarly, Prout 
and James conclude that: ‘The immaturity of children is a biological fact but the ways in 
which that immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture’.114 In the 
field of disability studies, Mulvany115 has called for the adoption of the notion of 
‘embodied irrationality’ in respect of mental disabilities, which addresses both the bodily 
experience of mental illness and the social constructions of such illnesses, thus avoiding 
biological determinism. 
In the same way that the social model destabilises the barriers between ‘ability’ and 
disability’, Herring116 argues that, rather than relying on the differences between adults 
and children in order to justify a different legal regime for children, a better approach 
would be to recognise that adults can be similar to children in terms of vulnerability and 
dependence. Thus, he concludes, a better case for equality of rights can be based on 
recognising the dependency and vulnerability of adults, rather than seeking to prove the 
competence and self-sufficiency of children.117 Adulthood is therefore not a final state. 
As Archard also observes: ‘Adulthood as a process is a continual becoming, a never-
completed maturing … there is no guarantee that ageing automatically brings with it 
maturity …’.118 
Like purely constructionist accounts of childhood or disability, a problem with too fluid a 
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notion of a difference is that there is a danger of ignoring the specific vulnerabilities 
experienced by certain sections of the population based on ‘natural’ attributes. Herring’s 
radical proposition aligns with a more fluid, social and contextual approach to capacity 
which recognises that age distinctions can be arbitrary and deterministic. Similarly, 
commentators argue that many, if not most, of us will experience some form of disability 
as our life progresses, whether of the mind or the body. The argument is a persuasive one, 
but tends towards eclipsing the specificity of (especially young) children’s vulnerability, 
as well as the needs of people with disabilities, and the particular ways in which children 
and people with disabilities experience discrimination. It is notable that equality claims 
through legal categorisation must invariably establish difference in order to be successful.  
Christine Overall has considered the connections between age and impairment in respect 
of older people.119 She argues that the idea that both disability and ageing are biological 
givens is ‘a fiction that functions to excuse and perpetuate the very social mechanisms 
that perpetuate ableist and ageist oppression’.120 For example, she notes that although age 
is thought to relate to the actual number of years lived, being elderly is a socially 
acquired identity that may vary across individuals, cultures and historical periods. 
Although she claims that she is not ‘denying the reality of the body’, she also writes that 
age, like impairment, is socially constructed ‘conceptually and materially’.121 While 
writing in the context of older people, this argument again rests on a biology/culture 
binary, privileging the social over the natural. It is possible to argue that notions of 
capacity are contested, and that the nominated ages for acquiring certain rights may be 
disputed, while also maintaining that there is a biological component to age and 
childhood. Overall’s observation that ‘there is a lot of cultural flexibility in the 
designation of the number of years that constitutes old age – and for that matter, youth 
and middle age’ does not necessarily correspond with her claim that ‘ageing is not a 
“natural” process’ and that it ‘is in no way outside of culture’.122 There is surely 
consensus across cultures and societies that a baby and a 100-year-old are ‘naturally’ 
young and old respectively. Indeed, Overall expresses concern about cultural reactions 
‘infantalising’ older people; this presumably suggests that ‘infants’ are in some way 
‘lesser’ or at least biologically different, creating an implicit recognition that there is 
something determinative about certain ages.123 This is not to deny the importance of 
recognising the socially-imbued characteristics of age and disability. However, as others 
have argued,124 that should not serve to deny the hybridity of the nature/social 
components of both disability and age. 
A difference, albeit a contested one, in the analogy with disability is that children are 
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likely to develop skills in reasoning as they age. The idea of children as developing 
beings, heavily influenced by the dominance of studies in developmental psychology,125 
differs from the notion of the potential, relative stasis of a particular disability. People 
with intellectual disabilities may not gather those attributes relating to capacity that all 
children tend to acquire eventually, however objectively or subjectively assessed. The 
danger with this temporal argument for children’s rights, in particular the right to non-
discrimination, is that it infers that children’s future status as adults somehow allows for 
rights violations in the present. Indeed, were a person, classified as disabled as a result of 
an intellectual impairment, to later attain ‘full capacity’ (however that may be 
determined, and despite the fact that tests for capacity rely on contentious norms), that 
would not influence the respect for their rights during the period of disability. That said, 
all children, barring any misfortune, will acquire the rights denied to them on reaching 
the age of majority. People with disabilities, on the other hand, are often with their 
condition for life. There is a qualitative distinction, therefore, between being exposed to 
discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services for a matter of several 
years rather than an entire lifetime. We might therefore be less concerned about assigning 
incapacity to a 2-month-old baby than to a person with even severe intellectual 
disabilities, since the baby is at least more likely to acquire capacity in the relatively near 
future so that a false assignation, however harmful, will be temporary. This relates to 
Fredman’s argument, above, about the fundamental difference with age discrimination, 
and other forms of discrimination. The absence of a ‘basic opposition between “self” and 
“other”’ in respect of children might also render capacity assessments more difficult in 
respect of people with disabilities than for, say, a 5-year-old child. As such, ageism and 
ableism are perhaps not as unproblematically connected as Overall suggests.  
A further problem with analogising disability and childhood is that activists may well 
balk at the suggestion that children experience comparative infringements of their right to 
exercise legal capacity. Many would no doubt argue that the rights violations experienced 
by people with intellectual disabilities are far more onerous.126 Indeed, such an argument 
echoes similar protestations that might be made in respect of discrimination against older 
people. Yet children are frequently subject to rights infringements because of the belief 
that they are less able to resist or complain, or because of their relative immaturity. For 
example, children across the globe have routinely been the subject of harmful age 
discrimination though the practice of corporal punishment.127 The UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has furthermore admonished the UK for the perpetration of negative 
social attitudes towards, and intolerance of, children.128 
The purpose of this article is in any case not to dilute the specificity of disability rights 
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arguments, nor to diminish the hardships experienced by older people. Rather, the aim is 
to broaden understandings of human fallibility and to provoke consideration of whether 
denying certain rights to children can be legitimated on the basis of comparison with the 
rights of other social groups. A ‘social model’ approach to children’s rights might arouse 
understanding of the ways in which social constructions of childhood unreasonably 
inhibit children’s autonomy, and for example act as an impediment to the realisation of 
their right to non-discrimination on the basis of age. The model is not just about a social 
constructionist account of childhood, although that is certainly its foundation, but could 
prove useful as a political tool for changing law and social policy. For example, the 
model has been used in disability activism for drawing attention to issues of access, such 
as to public buildings.129 Children similarly experience exclusions from these social 
spaces,130 and public policy should reflect the fact that such exclusions can result as 
much from perceptions of childhood as from any innate incapacities. Nevertheless, 
although the social model potentially provides a powerful form of critique, it must not 
fail to engage with age since this would relegate the biological component of childhood 
to the realms of medicine and developmental psychology.  
Conclusion 
There is evidence that the UK treats its children badly. In respect of child poverty, it is 
among the worst performing of all the wealthy nations,131 and it imprisons the highest 
proportion of children in Europe.132 It has been held to account by an international human 
rights body for the pervasiveness of discriminatory attitudes towards the young,133 and it 
is generally agreed that an ‘institutionalised mistrust’ of youth134 pervades social policy. 
We should therefore perhaps not be surprised that under-18s were omitted from age 
discrimination provisions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this discussion has helped to 
counter some of the arguments concerning the exclusion of children from non-
discrimination rights. My argument has focused on the questions of equality, autonomy 
and capacity, since it is these which tend to permeate discussions about extending 
children’s rights protection. It has also used the question of age discrimination to explore 
the analogies and divergences between childhood and disability studies, although the 
subject has been far from exhausted with interesting questions relating to citizenship and 
vulnerability, for example, remaining. An aim has also been to frame the exclusion of 
children within discourse on the rights of marginalised social groups in general, and to 
argue for the adoption of a social model approach to children’s rights protection. 
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There are structural impediments to children and young people bringing age 
discrimination claims. The capacity to exercise rights is contingent on a child-centred 
legal system in order that children, or their advocates, may claim those rights afforded to 
them. The recent cuts to legal aid, along with plans to slash funding further, do not bode 
well for children’s rights protection given that children rarely have the independent 
means to instruct advocates and take cases.135 This should also be understood in the 
context of benefits cuts which are liable to affect nine times as many children as adults.136 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of children within the EA could deter unfair treatment, and 
their continued exclusion suggests that they are less worthy of specific protection than 
other groups of people who fall within the entire remit of non-discrimination legislation. 
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